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The Guangdong provincial government’s publication of new measuresfor managing civil society organisations (4) was overshadowed inmedia reports by the unrest in Wukan Village in mid-December 2011.
The resolution of that crisis received praise in People’s Daily, (5) as well as
from the regime’s reformist faction. (6) The new measures are a foretaste of
what in practice could signify the “Guangdong model,” perhaps even more
than the peaceful resolution of the Wukan crisis.
On 22 November 2011, Liu Hong, director of Guangdong’s civil affairs de-
partment, announced the “Regulations for boosting support for developing
civil society organisations and standardising their management” (Guanyu
Guangdong sheng jinyibu peiyu fazhan he guifan guanli shehui zuzhi de
fang’an 关于广东省进一步培育发展和规范管理社会组织的方案), to take
effect from July 2012. A major change introduced in the regulations is that
such organisations will no longer need to be under the charge of an admin-
istrative unit (yewu zhuguan danwei 业务主管单位) in order to receive of-
ficial recognition. They will be able to register directly with the civil affairs
department, which will have no authority over them but will simply ensure
supervision of their activities (yewu zhidao danwei 业务指导单位).
Under the current national “Regulations on the management and regis-
tration of civil society organisations” (Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tioali 社
会团体登记管理条例), it is imperative to obtain permission from an admin-
istrative structure that would act as guardian and be responsible for a civil
society organisation. Depending on the organisation’s line of activity, this
administrative body was the corresponding department under the State
Council or local government, or even “another relevant administration.” In
practice, it has been extremely difficult to arrange such linkups, thus highly
restricting the formation of officially recognised civil society bodies.
According to the Fazhi Ribao journalist, this system has throttled civil so-
ciety organisations with too much control, thus weakening public partici-
pation in them. The Guangdong reforms aim at ending the need to attach
such organisations to an administrative unit and instead moving towards a
simple “supervision” of their activities. For local cadres it would mean no
concrete control over civil society organisations but minimal management,
as Fazhi Ribao has pointed out. Rather than incorporating such organisations
into an administrative system with a hierarchical structure, the reforms im-
part to the process “administrative separation” (qu xingzhenghua 去行政化)
in running them. According to local cadres interviewed by the daily, insuf-
ficient assistance measures for developing civil society organisations limits
citizen participation and thus their role as a “bridge” between the state and
the public. In an interview with Xin Shiji, Wang Zhenyao (7) takes a similar
approach by presenting the reforms as a foretaste of opening for social or-
ganisations, letting them play to the full a role complementary to that of
the state in ushering in economic and social change in the country.
Fazhi Ribao sees the Guangdong reforms as being much different in spirit
from the main national regulations on the management of civil society or-
ganisations, breaking especially with the rules adopted in 1998 governing
the registration of such organisations. These rules had sought to advance a
strong government in the face of a highly restricted civil society. Wang Jing
notes that the current reforms are part of continuing experimentation and
advances made in Guangdong, which in 2006 became the first province to
introduce a process of separating administrative units from civil society or-
ganisations. In July 2009, the national and Guangdong provincial civil affairs
departments signed an “Agreement for joint adoption of reforms and de-
velopment of civil affairs work in the Pearl River Delta” (Gongtong tuijin
zhujiang sanjiao zhoudiqu minzheng gongzuo gaige fazhan xieyi 共同推进
珠江三角洲地区民政工作改革发展协议). Several such texts have been un-
veiled at local levels, especially covering the registration of such organisa-
tions or extension of public funds for their development.
These changes have certainly not been limited to Guangdong. In early
2011, Beijing municipality likewise introduced a new measure to lower the
obstacles civil society organisations faced in registration matters. Sector-
wise, professional bodies, charities, and social service (shehui fuwu 社会服
务) or social welfare (shehui fuli 社会福利) organisations could register di-
rectly with the civil affairs department, which then took on the role of
guardian or helped them find one. However, as Wang Jing reported in
Jinghua Shibao, in the actual implementation process, only those civil soci-
ety organisations engaged in activities covered by the civil affairs depart-
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ment could qualify for its tutelage. This would be true, for instance, of or-
ganisations concerned with elderly care or similar charities but not of those
in the area of public health or workers engaged in more “sensitive” tasks.
The latter kind has to seek links with other administrative units.
Where the Guangdong reforms differ from those in Beijing is that in the
southern province, the system of tutelage is totally abandoned in favour of
supervision by an administrative unit. Moreover, the Guangdong arrange-
ment covers more ground, and as Wang Jing has shown, most types of civil
society organisations are covered. As for implementation, an NGO man-
agement office (minjian zuzhi guanliju 民间组织管理局) cadre in Dongguan
City told Wang that registration would henceforth be easy and quick, except
in cases where the central government explicitly says an organisation should
not be approved as it poses political hurdles.
Wang Jing says the new Guangdong measures have led to a transforma-
tion of relations between civil society organisations and the state, from one
of dependence to that of contractual collaboration. In November, Guang-
dong provincial Party secretary Wang Yang called for moving away from a
strong state-directed model and towards a more remote management of
civil society bodies. The reforms seek to delegate (fangquan 放权) a part of
the state’s prerogatives to such organisations to create linkages among pub-
lic powers (jieli 接力). The first stage of this power delegation consists of
developing and supporting strong and well-implanted civil society organi-
sations. Therefore it is necessary to expand the financial resources for such
organisations through state funding or incentives to the private sector to
back them financially. Special funds also need to be set up at the local level
to help establish and develop civil society organisations.
As part of the measures, the second stage towards delegation of powers
is to promote competition among civil society organisations leading to a
“survival of the fittest” (yousheng lietai 优胜劣汰) process. As per the new
provisions, such organisations must on their own develop transparent in-
formation disclosure on their activities and accept third-party rating (jieshou
disanfang de dengji pinggu 接受第三方的等级评估). However, the details
were not spelt out. Only those rated 3A or above would be eligible for taking
charge of some public services and be remunerated for it (zhengfu goumai
fuwu 政府购买服务).
This practice of entrusting to civil society organisations some public serv-
ices that the government cannot – or prefers not to – take on is already rel-
atively widespread in Guangdong. According to Fazhi Ribao, 15 percent of
registered civil society organisations have already taken over government
functions, and 9 percent receive state remuneration for this. One of the re-
forms’ aims is to standardise and generalise this practice so as to create a
network of civil society organisations complementing state functions by
2015. By then the number of such organisations is expected to exceed
50,000 in Guangdong Province. They are also expected to have become
more and more professionalised, with about 80 percent full-time staff. State
funding in exchange for public services taken on by these organisations thus
makes up a major financial resource for their growth. Liang Shuxin, who
formed the Weijijin foundation, told Wang Jing that a system of state re-
muneration for services rendered by civil society organisations could greatly
reduce their material difficulties and at the same time make public resource
allocation more transparent and equitable.
In order to ensure effective implementation of these reforms, Guangdong’s
provincial and municipal officials must adopt, in the first half of 2012, an
initial list of state functions that can be handed over to civil society organ-
isations as well as remuneration arrangements. The form such delegation
of functions has to take, the conditions thereof, and the remuneration
modes are all still being formulated.
Another facet of the Guangdong reforms is the possibility of developing
multi-sector professional associations (yiye duohui 一业多会), rather than
the current system in which one association may monopolise representa-
tion of a professional sector (yiye yihui 一业一会). Further, the reform facil-
itates the merging of several organisations or, conversely, the splitting of
one into a group; it also allows for creation of civil society bodies across lo-
calities or even affiliation of professional associations from Hong Kong and
Taiwan operating locally.
Wang Jing clearly shows that a debate persists in academia between those
who favour monopoly for a professional association over a sector of activity
and those preferring free competition among such associations. The main
problem facing these associations is that generally an organisation “man-
aged by cadres” (guanban zuzhi 官办组织) enjoys a monopoly over a sector
and prevents the entry of “popular” organisations. Expanding the number
of sectorial associations would break these monopolies and usher in com-
petition among them, leading to less efficient ones being phased out even
if they registered first. On the other hand, defenders of a monopolistic cor-
poratist system note that a major role of sectorial professional associations
is to establish norms that enterprises in their sector must follow. A multi-
plicity of associations would therefore only lead to a jumble of competing
norms and thus to chaos.
Xiao Han, associate professor at the China University of Political Science
and Law, plays devil’s advocate in an article in Xin Shiji, focusing on the risks
entailed in the reforms as a whole, quite apart from the disarray within pro-
fessional associations. He says replacing the tutelage of an administrative
unit with supervision of civil society organisations solely by the civil affairs
department is not necessarily a positive move. In the old system the struc-
ture overseeing such organisations shared the responsibility of control that
henceforth behoves entirely on the civil affairs department. With expanded
powers, the department has greater opportunity for rent-seeking and cor-
ruption, Xiao Han says. Therefore, organisations better attuned to “unwritten
rules” (qianguize 潜规则) will prevail. Xiao Han thus stresses the potential
instability of this half-way house where the reforms are headed in terms of
relations between the state and civil society organisations, i.e., a relaxation
of links but their persistence, nevertheless.
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